Colombia is sinking into an abyss of violence that grows more frightful each day.1 This paper examines the impact of the 38-year-old conflict on the nation's indigenous people, who constitute about 2% of the country's total population of roughly 44 million, form 84 distinct communities (pueblos), and speak 64 different languages.2
Civil wars always seem to involve horror in many forms, but one particularly terrible feature of this one is the high proportion of civilians who are killed, coercively displaced, or forced to endure constant threats to self, family and livelihood. Ostensibly a struggle of the Colombian state against an insurrection of guerrillas who want to topple the government and replace it with a Marxist-oriented one, the conflict is far more complex.
The pueblos are disproportionately subjected to the violence because 1) most communities are rural, and up until now this has been a mainly rural insurgency;3 2) many pueblos live in the zones of highest conflict; and 3) nearly 80% of the mineral and energy resources of the country (water, minerals, oil, biodiversity) are found in the 27% of the national territory that is collectively and inalienably owned by Colombian pueblos.4 These resources are of interest to many parties (international capital, the government, the combatants), resulting in many pueblos finding themselves chronically caught in the crossfire.5
Indigenous communities are targeted by all the armed groups: military (army and police), paramilitaries (Autodefensas de Colombia, AUC-Self-Defense Forces of Colombia6), and insurgents (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC-Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN-the National Liberation Army).7 The election in 2002 of third-party candidate Alvaro Uribe, a deeply conservative former senator and governor, indicates that the country was willing to try something new after talks with the FARC broke down in February 2002 and troops retook a demilitarized zone the size of Switzerland that had been ceded to the rebels in 1998. Uribe's win might indicate that more and more voters favor taking a hard line toward the insurgents, or that voters increasingly see no other viable alternative. Despite the measures to increase security taken by Uribe immediately following his inauguration in Aug. 2002,8 which included declaring a limited state of emergency (allowing him to sidestep congress and legislate by decree) and strengthening the military, both insurgent and paramilitary forces have grown. The ELN and the larger FARC (the richest and most powerful rebel group in Latin American history) control at least 1/4 of the national territory. The paramilitaries, who are blamed for 3/4 of the massacres, have increased by 560% since 1996. The amount of territory beyond the control of the state has grown, and public order continues to disintegrate, resulting in truly horrendous levels of violence. Colombia is a world leader in assassinations and kidnappings; its murder rate is ten times that of the U.S., and 1,000 citizens become internally displaced persons (IDPs) each day. 353,387 people were displaced in 2002, bringing the total number of IDPs over the last decade to more than 2.7 million people about 5% of the population.9 95% of crimes go unpunished. A human rights defender is assassinated about once every month.10 148 trade unionists were killed in 2002.11 One index of the violence is the Christian Science Monitor's report that 160,000 men are employed as bodyguards and private security guards, far surpassing the number of soldiers, 60,000.12
Hundreds of indigenous leaders have been killed, with not one of their killers brought to justice.13 Although over the last two decades the government ended its previous repressive policies toward indigenous organizing, and no longer assumed that political opposition equaled subversion, many authorities in the rural areas continue to assume that indigenous people are either actual or potential supporters of the guerrillas-due to their geographical location and their poverty-and hence appropriate targets for counterinsurgency measures.14 According to Armando Valbuena, the president of the Indigenous National Organization of Colombia (Organización Nacional Indígena de Colombia, ONIC), more than 150 members of indigenous communities were killed between Jan. 1, and September of 2002.15 A few examples of the repression follow. In 1994, 84 natives in the community of Coreguay were assassinated by the FARC.16 In 1996 an organization established by government decree, CONVIVIR (Servicios de Vigilancia y Seguridad Privada-Private Security and Surveillance Services) was responsible for the deaths of three Páez (Nasa) leaders in North Cauca.17 On Oct. 11, 2002 Gonzalo Opocué, a Nasa living in Villa Garzón, Putumayo, was shot dead by AUC paramilitaries because he didn't answer them-he was deaf and mute. On Jan. 18, 2003, paramilitaries tortured and assassinated 4 Kuna leaders.18 Paramilitary repression in the Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta and Serranía de Perija is extensive: a delegation visiting in Sept. 2002 reported that paramilitaries totally control agricultural marketing as well as indigenous communities' access to goods. Some areas have seen massacres, villages burnt, illegal military activities, and assassinations and recruitment carried out by the FARC.19 The Emberá-Katío communities in Córdoba have suffered tremendously from repression and forced displacement; in October of 2002, the Office of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights condemned the displacement of almost 1000 people because of continuing threats by guerrillas and paramilitaries.20
The conflict is rooted in decades-old struggle involving long-standing structural inequities, political repression, and widespread clientalism and corruption. According to the World Bank, the concentration of land ownership in Colombia is one of the greatest on the planet, and continues to grow.21 In 1990 The Economist described Colombia as one of the five most corrupt countries in the world.22 The push for constitutional reform that emerged during the late 1980s and resulted in the signing of a new Constitution in 1991 arose from the feeling on the part of many that the current social order was incapable of adapting to changing social conditions. Access to the government was gained exclusively through political parties via an entrenched system of patronage, with all other attempts to participate politically running the risk of being ignored or treated as subversion.23
Local struggles were concerned with land rights and the right to organize. The two remaining insurgent armies claim to represent the oppressed of the country-the poor, the landless, etc.-but today the conflict in most areas is a turf war more than anything else.24 Paramilitary leaders have become personally wealthy through forced displacement, which has left millions of acres in their hands; according to Adam Isacson, a frequently cited statistic indicates that 40 percent of Colombia's cultivable land is currently in the control of drug dealers and paramilitaries.25 We can also, as Kimberly Theidon suggests, refer to the conflict as a resource war, an "oil war," and a "corruption war," the latter label highlighting the huge amount of money made from illegal traffic in arms and drugs.26 Both the insurgents and the paramilitaries profit from the production and sale of cocaine and heroin. Most of the poppies are cultivated in the Cauca valleys and most of the coca is grown in Putumayo; both departments are located in the south of the country and contain numerous indigenous pueblos.27
Clearly, then, the Colombia case differs in significant ways from earlier leftist revolutionary campaigns in Latin America. The end of the Cold War and U.S. Congress apprehensions over being dragged into an unwinnable and interminable conflict have altered the nature of U.S. interventions in Colombia. Rather than oriented to containing communism, US military intervention has until recently been restricted to the counter-narcotics campaign: 90% of cocaine reaching the U.S. comes from raw material grown in Colombia. Nonetheless, the plight of indigenous pueblos is quite reminiscent of poor rural civilians caught in the crossfire during the periods of extreme violence in the 1980s in Guatemala, El Salvador and Peru.
Large sections of indigenous territory are occupied by guerrillas, paramilitaries and military detachments, and pueblo members are compelled to serve as guides, informers, or armed combatants, often by threatening their families.28 A telling example of indigenous vulnerability was the 1998 meeting between Francisco Rojas Birry, the indigenous senator, Abadio Green, then president of ONIC, and Carlos Castaño, the head of AUC: the agenda was negotiation of a ceasefire of sixty days in the highly conflictive zones of Córdoba and Urabá.29 In some cases the repression visited on the pueblos stems from their unwillingness to choose sides, or to grow coca. Some pueblo members do voluntarily join the guerrillas and, occasionally, even the paramilitaries-to protect their families in areas under paramilitary control, or for the promise of a uniform and pay. It is difficult to estimate how many pueblo members voluntarily join the guerrillas. Whereas the vast majority of Colombians discount any claims on the part of the insurgents to moral authority or ideological credibility (on the contrary, seeing them as kidnappers, assassins and extortionists), it is understandable that in rural areas of high conflict young indigenous (and non-indigenous) men and women might be attracted to the rhetoric of organizations like the FARC.
Illicit Crops
Narcotrafficking seriously imperils indigenous communities in many regions. In both the highlands and tropical forests and plains regions, illegal crops are grown, sometimes by choice, sometimes under duress. Either way, the traditional subsistence economy and social order are always severely damaged. In addition to intrafamilial disputes, health problems and possible legal penalties, pueblo members face potential loss of livelihood and health risks from aerial fumigation of coca and poppy fields, the result of implementation of Plan Colombia, an assistance package that was signed into law by President Clinton on July 13, 2000.30 Its stated purposes are to eradicate narcotics production and help restructure the country's economy, in particular ensure delivery of social and economic benefits to its cocoa- and poppy-growing regions. In its effort to eradicate illicit drugs the U.S. has already spent or requested nearly $2 billion in aid to Colombia. Aerial spraying of fumigants, which can seriously damage subsistence crops and sharply reduce fish and game, represents a particularly bad situation, for many communities have been forced to abandon their lands and flee to urban areas or neighboring Ecuador.31 The U.S. claims that the fumigants are innocuous, but much evidence to the contrary can be marshalled.32 The Kofán, located in the Putumayo region, one of the areas being heavily sprayed, have suffered enormously from this campaign. In July 10, 2002, the Organización Zonal Indígena del Putumayo, which represents 13 pueblos, protested both the failure of antinarcotics measures to distinguish between industrial plantations and small crops grown for subsistence, as well as the failure to respect the manual eradication agreements some farmers had signed with the government. The fumigation program, along with the fact that the Putumayo is fast becoming one of the world's deadliest places, has led Klaus Nyholm of the United Nations Drug Control Program to remark that "Fumigation has an effect, but we would argue it's an effect of displacement."33 Although the U.S. claims that only large-scale coca cultivation is targeted, delegations to the region have published reports documenting multiple cases of damage to farms of 1 to 3 hectares. Following the publication of the US Department of State's "Report on Issues Related to the Aerial Eradication of Illicit Coca in Colombia" in September, 2002,34 various environmentalist and human rights NGOs contested the findings. A statement by the American Anthropological Association sent to Congress in October35 argued that the report did not consider the full range of adverse health impacts that may result from the program, such as those resulting from decreased food supplies and displacement. Nor did it address the unique adverse social and cultural effects on the region's indigenous peoples, a substantial proportion of Putumayo's inhabitants, who belong to the Kofán, Andoke, Awa (formerly Kwaiker), Embera, Inga, Kamsá, Nasa, Siona, and Witoto pueblos. As these communities represent great cultural diversity and occupy a unique historical, cultural and socio-economic position in the nation, any distinctive impacts on these pueblos that may jeopardize cultural continuity and damage the very fabric of indigenous community life need to be fully considered in any analysis of potential "adverse effects to humans."
One obvious adverse effect is the well-documented decrease in food supplies. Despite the State Department's suggestion that damage to legal food crops is minimal (and Colombian law permits food crops interspersed with coca crops to be sprayed), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's analysis issued during the summer suggests that spray drift from aerial eradication could cause significant damage to neighboring non-target vegetation up to 600 feet downwind of the sprayed area.36 Damage to adjacent or nearby food crops clearly could occur. Although the State Department indicates that extensive collateral damage from spray drift does not occur, a great deal of recent evidence of damage to legal crops and pasture land of indigenous communities has been amassed. The Colombian Public Ombudsman provided some in September 2002,37 as did numerous indigenous communities in the region.38
The AAA statement noted that indigenous farmers in the region are engaged in subsistence agriculture and have at best limited resources to purchase additional food supplies. Their ability to travel to gain access to other sources of food and game is restricted in the many communities that are surrounded by armed actors. Not only could serious malnutrition result in populations already at risk, because the food production cycle is so closely intertwined with indigenous cosmological and ritual practices, the disruptions due to aerial eradication are also limiting the ability of these pueblos to practice their ways of life. We have abundant evidence that many families and entire communities are fleeing the areas being sprayed, spilling over into Brazil and Ecuador.
In addition to those living in tropical forest environments, pueblos such as Nasa, Guambiano and Kokonuko, located at higher elevations in the departments of Cauca and Nariño, are put at risk in the areas being sprayed in attempts to eradicate opium poppies. These groups also are experiencing threats and worse as rebels and paramilitaries battle for turf.39
The AAA statement noted that all of these pueblos have lived in their territories for hundreds of years. Displacement seriously threatens their ability to survive as distinct cultures. Indigenous culture is tied to territory-it constitutes not only the means for subsistence, but represents ancestral origins, a sacred space within which rituals and other activities should take place. Specific features of the landscape hold extreme importance. Loss of territory results in more than a simple loss of economic resources; when land and identity are inextricably bound together through cosmological, social, political and economic practices and beliefs, the loss of ownership of lands results in the breakdown of cultural identity. Forced migration not only results in serious socio-economic disruption-the dismal destinations awaiting them in urban areas and Ecuador, and the further impoverishment of already poor people-it also affects their ability to endure as distinct, self-sustaining cultures.
Some final considerations unique to indigenous communities affected by the aerial eradication program listed in the AAA statement include the fact that many indigenous communities depend primarily on the use of medicinal plants for their medical care and only secondarily on Western medical treatment. Communities have reported that the spraying has destroyed medicinal and sacred plants. In addition, many Colombian pueblos, particularly those in tropical lowlands, obtain their drinking water from small streams and rivers, and those families with wells often leave them uncovered. They also bathe and wash their clothes in streams. It is likely that planes flying at high speeds and up to 100 feet in altitude (planes fly higher than usual for crop spraying because of the danger of ground fire from the armed actors)40 may inadvertently spray these water sources. Many Colombian indigenous families do not own radios and consequently fail to hear announcements about when the spraying will take place, not to mention the fact that many indigenous families in these areas primarily speak their native language and have limited understanding of announcements in Spanish.
Indigenous voices have been raised in protest, with local, regional and national organizations strongly criticizing the aerial eradication program, among them ONIC, OPIAC (Organization of Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon), CRIC (Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca), and OZIP (Indigenous Organization of the Putumayo Zone). These organizations have presented alternative proposals for manual eradication and economic development. As noted above, hundreds of indigenous communities have made commitments to manually eradicate their coca crops.41 Their success has been heralded by the Director of the National Program of Alternative Development (PLANTE)42 and documented by civil society NGOs.43 The resolve of these pueblos to protect their cultures, their lands-their very future-clearly indicates a great capacity to engage in alternative economic development projects.
Of supreme irony, the eradication campaign has not worked. The price of cocaine and heroin on U.S. streets has remained constant over the past 10 years, and the amount of coca grown in South America also stayed about the same.44 In February 2002 the General Accounting Office recommended suspending aid to Colombia because coca production had increased, despite the fumigation of 95,000 acres.45 In March 2002 the White House Office of Drug Control Policy estimated that coca cultivation had increased by as much as one third in 2001.46 The well-known "balloon effect," in which drug production declines in a given region under pressure but overall production remains steady because cultivation and processing simply go elsewhere, is quite evident.47 In the Colombia case growers and processors are heading for countries to the south: Peru, Ecuador,48 and Bolivia.
Other Problems
Indigenous internal displacement elsewhere in the country is also an extremely grave problem. The plight of the Embera-Katío has already been mentioned. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees recently reported that 472 indigenous Panamanians, including 324 children, fled after their villages were attacked by Colombian paramilitaries.49 Such reports come to the attention of UNHCR because an international border has been crossed, but the vast majority of displaced natives remain inside the country.50
Many other pueblos throughout the country are experiencing the nightmare of war on a daily basis. The U'wa of northeastern Colombia bordering Venezuela are one of the more traditional pueblos, whose strategy for self-preservation had been to keep a very low profile, but their resistance to Occidental Petroleum's seismic testing put them into the international limelight. They are being hit from all sides: by ELN and FARC, who oppose all transnational companies drilling for oil, as they see this as draining the country of its natural resources. The U'wa oppose the drilling, too, but also oppose actions like ELN guerrillas' throwing Oxy equipment off a cliff, which, the U'wa say, only makes the conflict worse.51 Nor has the government supported the U'wa, despite its mandate to protect them, for it also favors oil exploration. They are also harassed by the paramilitaries. International solidarity efforts led to FARC's murdering three American pro-indigenous activists visiting U'wa territory in March, 1999. As happens in other areas, the position of neutrality, of refusing access to all armed actors, leads both guerrillas and paramilitaries to claim the U'wa are supporting with the other side. The U'wa's defense strategy, couched in moral, religious and environmentalist terms, has produced a remarkably sympathetic response from many quarters of the globe. The U'wa have steadfastly held to their beliefs regarding testing, which they see as a betrayal of the sacred relationship they hold with the land, mother earth. They also speak eloquently of harmony between humans and nature and hold defense of their ancestral territory to be of utmost importance if they are to survive as a people. Like all indigenous organizations, the U'wa find Plan Colombia inimical to their interests: U'wa leader Roberto Pérez states "We see Plan Colombia as an all-out invasion by the U.S."52
As if the war and their extremely vulnerable position were not enough, Colombia's indigenous pueblos have also experienced seriously adverse effects resulting from the neoliberal policies adopted during the 1990s which (as happened in every other South American country with indigenous populations except Chile) have led to the worst economic crisis in decades.53 In the early 1990s, President César Gaviria (1990-1994) agreed to resolve Colombia's debt crisis in favor of the recommendations put forth by international financial institutions and private banks, setting in motion a process of social and economic decline in the country that continues into the present.54 The peso continues to fall, devalued by 31% against the U.S. dollar in the last 12 months alone.55 Overall unemployment currently stands at 22%; it soars to 50% in rural areas.56 The effects on the vast informal economy are difficult to gauge, but clearly have been serious. The UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean says that 22 million Colombians (54.9%) are living in poverty, with 10.8 million (27.6%) experiencing extreme poverty.57
Throughout the decade, the Inter-American Development Bank promoted the privatization of public infrastructure. The government of Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) broadened these policies after 1995, and in 1999, President Andrés Pastrana was obliged to sign Colombia's first International Monetary Fund agreement, initiating a more intense program of privatization, fiscal austerity, and the massive dismissal of public sector workers.58 Current decisions on free trade agreements promise to deepen these effects and cancel any benefits from the ATPA, Andean Trade Preferences Act.
As noted, the neoliberal reforms do not benefit the country's indigenous pueblos. Decentralization as such does not empower or enhance their participation in civil society, and overall, the adoption of the goal of "minimalist" government, one that depends much more on the private sector, results in many communities being abandoned. For example, in Oct. 2002 indigenous and Afro-Colombian organizations in Valle del Cauca complained that the Interior Ministry had closed all of its offices, forcing people to travel to Bogotá for all procedures and claims.59 Furthermore, although Colombia has established a "safety net" (Red de Solidaridad) to ease the burden of structural adjustment on the poorest sectors, the Red cannot compensate for drastic cuts in public services, which have produced especially serious consequences for indigenous Colombians. Other measures, such as the elimination of price supports and subsidies for the agrarian sector, have gravely affected pueblos in both highland and lowland regions. The agricultural sector has been hit hard; heavily subsidized U.S. imports (leading us to question the notion of "free trade") like corn sell for less than that produced by indigenous and non-indigenous farmers, if they are to turn a profit. It is not surprising that several indigenous leaders see Plan Colombia as the military arm of a repressive U.S. economic policy in Latin America.
Earlier Optimism: The Signing of the 1991 Constitution
These pessimistic figures sharply contrast with the optimism surrounding the writing and signing of the new Constitution in 1991. As already mentioned, Colombian pueblos' long, often bloody struggle for land rights had finally led to gains during the 1970s and 1980s.60 The political and moral crisis resulting from the insurgency, the increase in violence as landowners and security forces attempted to root it out, and a pervasive distrust of a state controlled by the oligarchy led to, against considerable odds, the formation of a Constitutional Assembly. The new Constitution's far-reaching reforms promised more protection to the nation's pueblos than any other of the 17 Latin American constitutions signed during the democratic transition of the 1980s and 1990s. It significantly increased the pueblos' autonomy in decision-making regarding their territory, and guaranteed that cultural differences would be respected in the domains of education, health, and religion. It also transferred the right to adjudicate internal disputes and conduct criminal prosecutions in accordance with each pueblo's customary law-its "usos y costumbres."
The Colombian congress and other powerful interests have undermined crucial constitutional reforms aimed at creating a more open and legitimate political system, and clearly the continuing crisis in the public order has meant that many changes had no chance of being put into place. As noted above, neoliberal reforms have resulted in increasing impoverishment within a wide variety of sectors, most particularly in rural, agricultural areas, and have definitely not benefitted the country's indigenous citizens.
The Effects of U.S. Policy
It is clear that U.S. policy has not helped to bring peace. Although in addition to stamping out illegal drug cultivation, Plan Colombia and the Andean Initiative are intended to provide assistance for restructuring the country's economy, only 20% is earmarked for such programs. The high level of corruption virtually guarantees that this aid will arrive very late, or not at all. The remaining 80% goes to military aid, which in effect sanctions the continuing serious, well-documented human rights abuses on the part of some sectors of the military who maintain close ties with paramilitaries (who do the truly dirty work). The European Union's decision early on to sharply scale back their promised contribution to Plan Colombia, fearing this would only inflame the war, would seem to be prescient.
Following 9/11/01, U.S. government rhetoric has shifted from an anti-drug discourse to an anti-terrorism one.61 For example, Secretary of State Colin Powell has remarked that it no longer makes sense to insist on separating anti-terrorism from antinarcotics battles because both are threats to democracy. Colombia has been the third largest recipient of military aid (after Israel and Egypt) for several years, and the stepped-up increases in this kind of aid put the country roughly on a par with Afghanistan and Pakistan.62 The administration is requesting $537 million this year, up from $411 last year. The US has spent a total of $1.8 billion on antinarcotics measures, and military and law enforcement aid since 2000.63
Ample evidence lends support to the argument that post-Sept. 11 "terrorism" discourse applied to the Colombian case has become the framing. Examples include Bush saying on the occasion of a meeting with former president Pastrana in spring, 2002 that they concentrated on "how to change the focus of our strategy from counter-narcotics to include counter-terrorism."64 Pastrana affirmed that "that is why we are asking the support of the United States to fight narcoterrorism, the support of the world to fight this common enemy, with its violence financed by drugs."65 Illegal drugs no longer seem to be the main problem, it's the violence drug money permits. The final mission now would seem to be focused more on fighting terrorism than on ending the supply of narcotics to the U.S. Here is Bush again: "By fighting narco-trafficking, by the way, we're fighting the funding source for these political terrorists. And sometimes they're interchangeable."66
In addition to the changes in rhetoric about U.S. assistance, several analysts have come to believe that due to global shifts, in particular the instability in Venezuela and the Middle East, the U.S. has shifted from a primary concern with illegal drugs arriving from Colombia to one over guaranteeing a reliable source of oil.67 Shifts in actual policy lend support to such an argument.68 A Foreign Operations bill was formally introduced in 2002 that, for the first time, explicitly expands the nature of aid to Colombia, authorizing 538.2 million dollars for fiscal 2003 "to support a unified campaign against illicit narcotics trafficking, terrorist activities, and other threats to the national security of Colombia."69 In July 2002 Congress approved a provision in antiterrorism legislation that would allow some American-supplied equipment, like helicopters, to be used directly against the rebels.70 The proposal to spend $98 million to protect the 483-mile pipeline from Caño Limón oil fields to the Caribbean port of Covenas, owned in part by Occidental Petroleum also suggests that the primary concern is shifting from eradicating drugs to guaranteeing a steady supply of oil.71 The money is being used to create, train and equip a Colombian army brigade (about 2,000 soldiers). In January 2003 the US deployed 70 Green Berets to train an antiguerrilla commando group in Arauca, site of the Caño Limón oil pipeline.72
Protesting that such a policy reeks of corporate welfare, critics have pointed out that it adds up to about $3 per barrel in US taxpayer subsidy to Occidental. Let Occidental pay for its own security, they write, adding that this sort of US participation in Colombia would be repeating the mistakes of El Salvador and Vietnam.73 Proponents of the plan argue that such protection helps ensure an important source of revenue to the Colombian government, allowing it to finance more of the war on drugs, which is, after all, something the U.S. has explicitly demanded. Some supporters acknowledge that the proposed legislation is a test to see if Congress is willing to extend its funding to fighting terrorist groups beyond Al Qaeda.
Conclusion
The current situation in Colombia is extremely worrisome, and the uncertain future facing the entire country means its indigenous populations are tremendously vulnerable. According to Jorge Rojas, the president of CODHES (Consultoria para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento-Consultation for Human Rights and Displaced Persons),74 if the present trajectory continues, Colombia will lose 1/2 of its indigenous population: some will die, and others will lose their lands, the result of forced displacement to the "zonas de miseria" surrounding the urban areas, or to refugee camps in Ecuador, Panama and Brazil. Let us hope that a just and lasting solution can be found to this terrible tragedy, one that avoids the bloodbaths experienced in Guatemala and Peru.
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