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Perspectives on the Crisis in Darfur
Viewed through an anthropological lens, the humanitarian crisis in Darfur is infinitely more complex than the mainstream media has framed it to be, according to recent exchanges by anthropologists on this topic. In light of this, the AAA’s Committee for Human Rights, Association for Africanist Anthropology and Paul Nuti, Director of External, International and Government Affairs, have been exploring how to communicate the nuance and complexity of the situation to the public with greater accuracy, and how to provide input to policymakers addressing the crisis. In reaching out to frontline organizations to learn more about the advocacy environment on Darfur, Nuti interviewed for AAA and Anthropology News Georgette Gagnon, an international human rights lawyer and deputy director of the Africa division of Human Rights Watch. Nuti also interviewed Suliman Baldo, Camulus Omogo and Lindsay Carter, program staff and researchers at the International Crisis Group, a conflict resolution organization. Baldo, who holds a PhD in comparative literature from the University of Dijon in France and studied as an undergraduate at the University of Khartoum, is the program director at ICG. Omogo holds an MA in Peace Studies from the University of Notre Dame. A Fullbright Scholar, he researches conflict in the Horn of Africa and currently serves as Africa program research assistant at ICG. Carter, while working on her MA in International Development at American University, researches Sudan and the Great Lakes Region; she is currently ICG’s Africa program research assistant. AN: From a public education point of view, what are the most important things about the crisis in Darfur that citizens should know? Human Rights Watch: The important issue for Human Rights Watch is to document the facts—what happened, when did it happen, to whom did it happen—so that we can get accurate information out to the public. In this vein, what citizens should know is that over 2 million people have been displaced, 70,000 people have been killed, ethnic cleansing has been carried out by government and militias against tribal groups supporting two rebel movements, and innocent civilians have been victimized by looting, raping and destruction of property. The ethnic cleansing campaign is complete and displaced persons are now living in refugee camps where they have absolutely nothing. In our public outreach, we challenge people to think about the victims in Darfur as if they are us: try to imagine a situation in which you are forcibly kicked out of your house, your possessions are taken, your bank account is looted, your relatives are killed or taken away, you are relocated to a refugee camp, and, if you are a woman, you are raped. Under these circumstances, you would ask yourself: what the hell will I do now? Putting it to the public this way and ensuring that the realities of the crisis are communicated accurately helps in moving the relevant actors and the public to take a stand. International Crisis Group: To view the conflict in Darfur as principally about governance and wealth sharing. The conflict pits a clique of people in the government of Sudan bent on manipulating religion and ethnicity to ensure that they concentrate power, wealth and influence in Khartoum against rebels from several tribal groups. Darfur, a potential oilfield, could be another mechanism by the government to drive the people from potentially wealthy areas. AN: What kinds of advocacy could actually make a difference in the resolution of the crisis? HRW: There are three advocacy priorities that Human Rights Watch is pursuing. First, all actors must do everything possible to reverse the ethnic cleansing. Second, refugees must be allowed to return to their homes/regions safely and with dignity. And third, those who perpetrated ethnic cleansing and other human rights violations must be held accountable and brought to justice. It should be noted that the UN has established an international commission of inquiry charged with investigating human rights violations in Darfur and making recommendations along these lines. We believe that the status quo cannot be permitted to stand. There is a growing sense in some quarters that the crisis in Darfur has been stabilized somewhat. Human Rights Watch is trying to counter this view by advocating for the reversal of ethnic cleansing, the return of refugees and justice for the victims. Further, it must be made clear that if the farmers who are now refugees cannot get back to their lands to plant before next spring, there will be a food shortage in the region and malnutrition will spread. From a humanitarian assistance perspective, it is vital to end the reliance on international aid. ICG: The immediate need is civilian protection. Concurrently, according to a recent ICG briefing on October 5, “The UN Security Council should give itself further leverage on Darfur by moving quickly to deploy the first elements of the International Commission of Inquiry it established by its September 18, 2004, resolution. If there is not concrete progress on its Darfur demands . . . especially the African Union (AU) protection force, the Council should impose an arms embargo on the Sudanese government, an assets freeze on companies owned by the ruling party that do business abroad, and a travel ban on senior Sudanese officials.” Diplomatic pressure should be applied to swiftly conclude the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (Naivasha) process between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement. This should be backed up with meaningful penalties if the government of Sudan is slow and delays the process. AN: To what extent are human rights questions in Darfur linked to the negotiation or assertion of cultural and ethnic identities? HRW: Clearly, ethnic differences have led to human rights violations in Darfur. There is ample evidence that the Sudanese government has used ethnic issues to manipulate Arab groups and get them to collaborate with it, as Janjaweed. The consequence is that there is much more polarization along ethnic and cultural lines than there has ever been previously. Up to this point, ethnicity was a fluid concept in Darfur. In the past, tribal groups used local structures, mechanisms and institutions to resolve disputes or settle differences over resource access, land rights and other issues. Now, however, these local solutions are breaking down because of government interference. Because there is no democracy and no political parties, people in Darfur claim their identities and bring grievances through their tribal groups. Entrenchment of ethnicity is reinforced and ethnic cleansing or other human rights violations become more possible. ICG: The cultural and ethnic dimensions of the crisis are complex and are issues not just for Darfur, but for Sudan. It is not just about ethnicity. The parties to the current conflict are attempting to use Darfur’s complex and fluid identities to their advantage. Local groups of Arab origin identify with Arab-ised groups in Khartoum and the traditional center of Sudan’s ruling elites. In response to what was then a minor insurgency by a few young men, Khartoum in mid-2003 mobilized the paramilitary Popular Defense Forces and associated Janjaweed militia along ethnic lines and unleashed them against the entire civilian base of the rebellion, Darfur’s autochthonous groups. The Darfur rebels are seeking to capitalize on the label “African” to gain the support of the Southern Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the international community. However, the two groups have much in common, they are uniformly Muslim, and generations of intermarriages have blurred whatever racial distinctions they had previously. The conflict has strained relations between the two groups, but it has so far failed in setting them against each other. It is noteworthy that Darfur’s largest Arab groups have refused to join the fight on the side of the government, despite persistent attempts from their own extremists and government propagandists to draw them into the conflict. The Naivasha process is likely to bring Southerners into governance. It is here that the inadequacy of resolving Sudan’s conflicts hinges. Other ethnic groups, who are equally excluded from governance and wealth sharing, cannot afford to be left out of this grand process. Thus, this is the best way is to assert their claims, whatever it takes. Darfurians have taken up arms; an armed group has recently emerged in neighboring West Kordofan State and declared its intention to rebel, citing similar grievances; and eastern Sudan is potentially explosive. In short, a wider cross-section of Sudanese feels disenfranchised. And the long history of socialization and intermarriages has blurred strict distinctions between ethnicities. AN: Analysts and relief officials have suggested there is considerable resistance in Darfur and Sudan to proposals for resolving the crises that come from outside of Africa and the Middle East. What is your view on this and prospects for and significance of African/ME-based solutions? HRW: All of the international actors are very much aware that a resolution to the Darfur crisis must be African-based. The African Union is seen as the one organization that can resolve the crisis and undertake appropriate interventions. The AU has taken the lead in monitoring the current cease-fire, it has just endorsed an expansion of the current force, and its mandate will soon expand to include the protection of civilians. The key question with regard to the AU, however, is whether it can deliver. There are concerns about the capacity of the AU to handle the logistical demands of the current mandate. There is full agreement, though, among external actors—including the US and the European Union—that the AU should own this initiative. Support from the US and the EU should be seen as being provided at the behest of the AU. And all long-term observers/analysts of Sudan point out that, at the end of the day, a solution should come from the parties involved—in much the same way that the Naivasha Agreement was reached. There is little chance that a solution can be imposed from the outside. ICG: Sudan, like other Muslim countries, perceives Western intervention as an extension of its domination of and interference in the Muslim world. Consequently, direct intervention by the West, especially the US, even a genuine response to a humanitarian crisis or a move to maintain international peace and security, would be suspect. However, Sudan publicly acknowledges the positive role of the US alongside Norway, Britain and Italy in facilitating the Naivasha peace process. Nonetheless, direct humanitarian intervention led by Western countries is unlikely because of a lack of political will to be drawn into another African conflict after the peacekeeping and humanitarian fiascos in Somalia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. The UN and the rest of the international community have opted instead to back the AU intervention logistically and financially. While agreeing in October to a substantial increase in the numbers of AU peacekeepers [from the initial deployment of 300 to 3,500] and a strengthening of their mandate, Khartoum’s government adamantly resisted an extension of their mandate to cover civilian protection. Khartoum’s principal argument against civilian protection is that it would infringe on its sovereign right to protect its citizens, and demonstrate its inadequacy as a government. To play into the government’s hands, the AU has instead proposed an ambiguous mandate to the troops that it hopes would allow them to act as a deterrent and intervene to protect civilians at risk. The acceptance of the AU troops, while laudable, is deemed by the government as the “lesser of the two evils.” Although the AU essentially interferes in the internal matters of a sovereign nation, this principle is still alien to most African leaders who would prefer non-interference. However, Khartoum has underestimated the resonance of Darfur’s events in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa and its attempt at the beginning of the crisis to protect itself against an increasingly intrusive role of the AU by appealing to the solidarity of the Arab League, of which Sudan is an important member. In the nexus between the Muslim world and the West, African intervention is likely to be a better option. Moreover, Nigerian troops have experience in peacekeeping. The prospects are there and AU should be assisted and reminded of its role to protect civilians. AN: The genocide dimension of the Darfur crisis has been, in the view of many, politicized in diplomatic circles and underplayed in the press. How can this be explained? HRW: In the view of Human Rights Watch, the principal issue is a lack of resources. The UN, for example, may declare that genocide has been perpetrated in Darfur but it is not in a position in terms of resources to respond. Its credibility would be undermined if it threatened to act under the terms of the Geneva Conventions but could not follow through. The US has a different problem: though it has called the situation in Darfur genocide, it is in a vulnerable position because of its actions in Iraq. There would be skepticism that US intervention would improve the situation so the US has chosen to simply say that it is doing what needs to be done. For Human Rights Watch, the core issue with regard to genocide in Darfur is what are we doing and what can we do on the ground to improve peoples’ lives? ICG: The serious press is aware that the application of the term “genocide” to all types of conflicts has tended of late to devalue the term. The use of the term in diplomatic circles in relation to Darfur principally stemmed from awareness of the massive and systematic nature of grave violations of the laws of war by Khartoum armed forces and government-supported militias. |
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